WORKING PAPERS
Board Turnover and Political Interference : Are they Important Determinants of SOEs financial performance? with Oleksandr Talavera and Sotirios K. Bellos
Global economic crisis accentuated the need of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) profit orientation in times of staggered economic activity and fiscal constraints. This paper analyses the impact of politically induced board turnover on performance of SOEs. The research was conducted within six countries of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the period 2010-2014. We find that increase in board turnover has negative effect on performance of SOEs in both financial and efficiency terms. Furthermore, our research proves that unlike for private enterprises board turnover within SOEs is induced by political forces (election cycles).
Corruption Induces Higher Levels of Innovation: What Stems behind the Scenes? with Sotirios K. Bellos and Katarina Djulic
Literature implies that corruption, state share and expertise of top management can have a strong influence on SOEs performance and innovation. Using BEEPS 2012-2014 database, this paper applies cross section analysis, as to examine this literature implication in transition economies. Our results imply that larger manufacturing enterprises with experienced top management and international quality assurance certificates will have higher levels of innovation. Moreover, enterprises faced with higher levels of corruption and competition appear to innovate more, while state ownership proves to be insignificant for innovation activity.